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the franchisor cannot achieve the first-best outcome via sales-based royalties 
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1. Introduction 
In resent times, the franchise arrangement has emerged as a popular 
arrangement within the retail industry, particularly such as convenience stores 
(hereafter CVS), retailing, and restaurants. A franchise arrangement generally 
includes the payment of a franchise fee as well as a royalty. In particular, the 
royalty structure is an important element in a franchise arrangement. In Japan, 
the majority of the convenience stores franchisors charge royalties based on the 
gross margin (hereafter MBR) achieved by their franchisees. There is, however, a 
small section of franchisors that operates on the system of charging royalties 
based on the sales (hereafter SBR) achieved by their franchisees. 
According to the JFA (Japan Franchise Association), franchised businesses 
account for about 1,200 franchise brands and roughly 240,000 outlets in Japan. 
Their total sales in 2006 amounted to approximately 20 trillion yen, which 
corresponded to one third of the total retail sales figure4. Franchise fees are a 
form of compensation paid by the franchisee to the franchisor for the use of a 
brand’s name, logo, good will, marketing and other systems. In some cases, a 
franchisor supplies its franchisees with its own goods and materials. Another 
kind of franchise arrangement, observed commonly in ventures such as car 
dealers and gas stations, is based on goods and the brand name. As is evident 
from the CVS and the food & beverage industry, the number of the other kinds of 
franchise arrangements that are based on business formats is increasing every 
year.  
Under the business format franchises, the roles that the franchisor and 
franchisee must fulfill are expressed in the franchise arrangements. A franchise 
arrangement also emphasizes that both parties will initiate their efforts under 
the terms of the arrangement. The franchisor’s role lies in brand advertisement 
and product innovation, while the franchisee’s role is to provide a sales service 
and generate a local advertisement. However, whether they have met their 
obligations is not necessarily verifiable. In addition, the franchisor also 
recommends to the franchisee the essential particulars of the business activity: 
what to sell, where to purchase, and how to set the retail price and so on. However, 
the franchisee, under the franchise arrangements, also has a right to decide in 
                                                                          
4 See Yahagi (1994) and Kim (2001) for the franchise system and the fact-finding in Japan. 
See Lafontaine (1992) and Lafontaine and Slade (1997, 2007) for the franchise system in 
America. In America, the total sales of the franchise brands account for about 40 
percent of the total retail sales. 
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these matters. In other words, a franchisee has partial autonomy. 
This paper focuses on two types of royalty － MBR and SBR － under 
double-sided moral hazard that is widely prevalent in franchise arrangements. 
The notion of double-sided moral hazard is introduced to explain the various 
types of institutional arrangements. The problem of double-sided moral hazard 
was first analyzed in the nature of the franchise arrangement by using the 
theoretical tools of the firm (Rubin, 1978). Rubin also argued that the franchise 
relationship is an intermediate one between a firm and a market transaction. 
These arguments have since been formalized in franchise arrangements (Lal, 
1990). The results of the empirical analysis of franchise arrangements have been 
found to be consistent with double-sided moral hazard, suggesting that there are, 
in fact, really incentive issues on both sides (Lafontaine’s, 1992, p 281). In a 
wholesaler-retailer relationship, if there exists double-sided moral hazard and 
their efforts are substitutionary, the first-best outcome (jointly Pareto efficient 
with all rent accruing upstream) is unattainable (Romano, 1994). Moreover, 
vertical restraint (RPM) can control double-sided moral hazard (Romano, 1994). 
When the efforts of both parties are perfectly complementary, even if there exists 
a double-sided moral hazard in the franchise arrangements, the first-best 
outcome is attainable by adopting MBR or SBR (Maruyama, 2003)5.  
In comparison with previous research, this paper analyzes why MBR is more 
efficient than SBR under double-sided moral hazard. We shall show that the 
franchisor can obtain the first-best outcome under double-sided moral hazard by 
adopting MBR. In addition, we shall examine a discrete model of the effects 
caused by whether both parties will abide by a business-format arrangement or 
not. In this paper, we consider the case of a franchisee that deals with two goods; 
one is purchased from its franchisor and the other is purchased from another 
independent manufacturer. Under such a condition, the franchisor has no control 
whatsoever on the wholesale prices of its franchisee. We shall show that a 
franchisor can achieve the first-best outcome under double-sided moral hazard by 
employing MBR.  
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe the 
model and characterize the first-best outcome as a benchmark. In Section 3, we 
show that a franchisor can achieve the first-best outcome under double-sided 
                                                                          
5 Our model is similar to Maruyama (2003) and Lal et al. (2000). The main difference 
between out setup and theirs is that our franchisee deals with two kinds of goods. However, 
in their models, the franchisee deals with only one goods. They obtain the different results 
whether the franchisor can set the wholesale price to be lower than its marginal cost or not. 
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moral hazard by employing MBR instead of SBR. Finally, the concluding remarks 
are outlined in Section 4. 
 
2. Model 
For simplicity, consider a franchiser and a franchisee. They are both assumed 
to be risk neutral. The franchisee deals with two kinds of goods: goods 1 and goods 
2. Goods 1 are provided by the franchisor, while goods 2 are purchased from 
another independent producer6. We assume that the franchisee is able to transact 
goods 2 under the franchise contract with the franchisor.  
For simplicity, the demand function of the goods i for the franchisee is 
 
2,1, =++−−= iseeptaq iDiUiiiii                                  (1) 
 
where qi is the sales volume of goods i, pi is the retail price of goods i, eUi and eDi 
are the effect on the demand respectively of the franchisor’s and the franchisee’s 
efforts, si is a random variable that denotes the state of the demand is of mean 
zero(Esi=0), and ai and ti are positive constants.  
The franchisor decides whether to make an effort (u=1) or not (u=0). If the 
franchisor decides to make an effort, the demand function shifts upwards (eUi=ui). 
This costs kU(1)=bU. However, if the franchisor does not make an effort, no cost is 
incurred and no influence is exerted on the demand function (eUi=0). The 
franchisee also determines whether to make an effort (d=1) or not (d=0). The 
effect of the franchisee’s efforts on the demand follows the same mechanism as 
the franchisor’s efforts. If the franchisee makes an effort, the demand function 
shifts upwards (eDi=di). This costs kD(1)=bD. However, if the franchisee does not 
make an effort, no cost is incurred and no influence is effected on the demand 
(eDi=0). 
To begin with, to obtain a benchmark, we examine the joint profits between the 
franchisor and the franchisee. The joint profits are as follows. 
 
                                                                          
6  We assume that the franchisee is able to purchase goods 2 from the independent 
manufacturer under the franchise contract. Consider a franchisee that initially managed a 
liquor store or a vegetable store and now operates a convenience store, selling the usual items 
such as liquors or vegetables and fruits purchased from another independent producer. 
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where c1 is the purchasing price of goods 1, which the franchisor purchases from a 
producer and c2 is the purchasing price of goods 2 which the franchisee purchases 
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First-Best Outcome 
For simplicity, we assume that both the franchisor and the franchisee decide to 
initiate their efforts (u and d), and the franchisee sets a retail prices pi for goods i 
before the state of demand si is realized. We define the first-best outcome by (u*, 
d*, pi*), which maximizes the expected joint profits. Therefore, the franchisee 
chooses the retail prices in order to maximize the excepted joint profits as follows: 
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The expected joint profits depend on whether the franchisor and the franchisee 
choose to initiate efforts. There are four possible cases, in accordance with the 
                                                                          
7 When both parties do not make efforts, consider a maximization problem of the expected 
joint profit. In such a case, the expected margin and sales volume are pi-ci=(ai-tici)/2ti and 























































The first and the second terms in parenthesis in the LHS in the above equations 
denote the values of the franchisor’s effort and the franchisee’s efforts, 
respectively. Analogous properties hold for the optimal retail price p*(u, d) and 
the expected sales volume Eq*(u,d). 
A double-sided moral hazard occurs in the condition where both parties need to 
make efforts in order to maximize the expected joint profits. It is not difficult to 
imagine that the double-sided moral hazard in such a circumstance is consistent 
with the reality. The necessary and sufficient condition for the first-best outcome, 
which both parties make efforts and the optimal retail price is 
pi*(1,1)=(ai+ui+di+tici)/2ti, is 
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Furthermore, we assume that hU and hD are sufficiently larger than bU and bD, 
respectively. Specifically, this assumption takes the following form.  
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Assumption 1.  hU>bU and hD>bD. 
 
We specify the first-best outcome for given Assumption 1 as follows. 
 
Proposition 1. Given Assumption 1, the first-best outcome specifies that 
(1) Both the franchisor and the franchisee make efforts. 
(2) The franchisee sets the equilibrium retail prices pi*(1,1). 
 
Proof) 
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Q.E.D. 
 
Consider a case where the two conditions in Assumption 1 are not satisfied at 
the same time. In such a case, the first-best outcome requires both efforts. 
Proposition 1 does not satisfy this strictly necessary condition. Therefore, the 
first-best outcome is restricted under Assumption 1.  
Note Eq. (6-3). Therefore, hU and hD can be interpreted as profit increments due 
to the franchisor’s and franchisee’s efforts, respectively. As a matter of fact, 
Assumption 1 implies that the profit increment created by each effort is larger 
than the cost increment produced by each effort. Let us compare Eq. (6-1) with Eq. 
(6-3). When the franchisor makes an effort, the payoff increment due to 
franchisee’s effort correspond to g. Similarly, let us compare Eq. (6-2) with Eq. 
(6-3). When the franchisee makes an effort, the payoff increment due to 
franchisor’s effort coincide exactly with g. Therefore, the value of g can be 
interpreted as the synergy effect between their efforts. Further, Proposition 1 
implies that the first-best outcome requires that the franchisee set the 
equilibrium retail price pi*(1,1), and both parties make efforts under the condition 




3. Margin-based Royalty vs. Sales-based Royalty 
In the previous section, we showed the first-best outcome requiring both efforts 
and a retail price pi*(1,1) under Assumption 1. When goods are on sale under a 
franchise arrangement, it is efficient for the franchisor to achieve the first-best 
outcome. However, since the realization of each effort is unverifiable, it is difficult 
for the franchisor to enforce their effort levels through a contract clause. It is not 
inevitable that both parties will initiate their optimal efforts. In this section, we 
show that the franchisor can attain the first-best outcome by adopting MBR 
under a double-sided moral hazard. 
The timing of the game is organized as follows. At stage one, the franchiser 
offers its franchisee a franchise contract8 that prescribes the wholesale price for 
goods 1 (w1), a franchise fee (F), a type and rate of royalty(r). The franchisee 
decides whether to accept the contract or not. If the franchisee does not accept it, 
the game is terminated. In this case, both payoffs are zero. If the franchisee 
accepts it, it pays the franchise fee to its franchisor. At stage two, both parties 
decide whether they will make efforts or not. It is worth noting that both efforts 
are unverifiable to the third party. Before the state of nature is realized, the 
franchisee sets the retail price in order to maximize its expected profit9. At stage 
three, after the state of nature is realized, the volume of sales of each type of 
goods is determined under each given retail price. Finally, the purchase payments 
and the royalty are transferred according to the original contract. We focus on the 
sub-game perfect equilibrium of the game. 
 
3.1 Margin-based Royalty 
To begin with, we show that the first-best outcome is attainable via MBR. When 















                                                                          
8 It is a take-it-or-leave-it offer without any negotiation on the terms. 
9 If the franchisee has private information to the state of nature, si, the joint profits will 
increase when the franchisor delegates the right to decide the retail price to the franchisee. 
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where vi is the purchasing prices of goods i. Note that the first-best price of goods 
1 purchased from the franchisor is equal to the wholesale price(v1=w1) and the 
first-best price of goods 2 purchased from the independent producer is equal to 







)( +++=                                           (7) 
 
where the superscript M denotes the case that the franchisor has adopted MBR. 
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Next, we turn to stage two. Let us compare Eq. (4) with Eq. (7). Note that the 
necessary and sufficient condition require that the franchisor set w1=v1=c1 for 
goods 1 at stage one.  
Next, we turn to their efficient effort levels. When the franchisor chooses the 
first-best effort level, the franchisor sets a royalty rate r so that the franchisee's 
first-best effort is more profitable than the franchisee’s no-effort. This is 
illustrated in the following equation. 
 








































In order to induce the franchisee to choose d=1 under the conditions that w1=c1 
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Eq. (9) implies that, in order to induce the franchisee’s effort, the franchisor 
should set the royalty rate r to be somewhat low. 
 
Franchisor’s Behavior 
Next, we turn to the franchisor’s behavior in stage two. The expected profit of 














The first term in the RHS is the selling price received on providing goods 1 to the 
franchisee. The second term in the RHS is the royalty paid by the franchisee to 






















As mentioned previously, it is necessary for the franchisor to set w1=v1=c1 in 
order to obtain the first-best outcome under MBR. Let us consider the franchisor’s 
efficient effort level. To achieve the first-best outcome, the franchisor should set 
the royalty rate in a way that induces it to make an effort under the condition 
that the franchisee makes an effort. This case is illustrated in the following 
equation. 
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Eq. (10) implies that, in order to induce the franchisor’s effort, the franchisor 
should set the royalty rate r to be more or less high. From Eq. (9) and Eq. (10), 
therefore, in order to induce that d=1 and u=1 for given w1=c1, the franchisor 
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In fact, if the royalty rate is too low, Eq. (10) is not satisfied, that is, the franchisor 
will not make an effort. Conversely, if it is too high, Eq. (9) is not satisfied, which 
implies that the franchisee will not make an effort. We assume then that the 
synergy effect between their efforts, g, would have to be sufficiently large. This 
assumption takes the following specified form.  
 
ASSUMPTION 2.  g>max { bU, bD }. 
 
Under Assumption 1 and Assumption 2, we characterize the following 
proposition: 
 
PROPOSITION 2. Suppose that Assumption 1 and Assumption 2 are satisfied. 




If the franchisor can set the wholesale price equivalent to its purchase price, 
that is w1=c1 for goods 1, and can set the royalty rate r satisfying Eq. (11), the 
franchisor can attain the first-best efforts at stage two. As a result, double-sided 
moral hazard is settled. There is no constraint condition for setting w1=c1. 








U bb  
 
From the facts that (hU+g)>2bU and (hD+g)>2bD under ASSUMPTION 1 and 
ASSUMPTION 2, the above condition is satisfied. In addition, the franchisor can 
set the royalty rate, r, satisfying Eq. (11). 
Q.E.D. 
 
Under the condition that the payoff increment due to each party’s effort is 
larger than the cost increment, the inequalities of Assumption 1 are satisfied. 
From Proposition 1, the first-best outcome requires that both parties make efforts 
and the franchisee sets the equilibrium retail prices p1*(1,1) and p2*(1,1). If the 
synergy effect between their efforts, g, is sufficiently large to satisfy Assumption 2, 
from Proposition 2, the franchisor can implement a royalty rate, r, satisfying Eq. 
(11) under MBR. Therefore, the franchisor is able to realize, in stage two, their 
efficient efforts of both franchisor and franchisee. Note that the franchisor is able 
to charge the franchise fee on its franchisee. Therefore, the franchisor is able to 
maximize its expected payoff at stage one by offering a franchise contract that 
leads to the first-best efforts. 
Furthermore, we assume that the expected total payoff increment due to each 
party’s effort is greater than the total costs owing to such efforts. This assumption 
takes the following specified form. 
 
Assumption 3.  Min { hU, hD } > bU + bD.  
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To begin with, suppose that max{hD, hU}=hU. The above equation can be rewritten 
as follows 
 













Proposition 3. Suppose that Assumption 3 is satisfied. Then, the first-best 




Suppose that Assumption 3 is satisfied. Note that Assumption 3 is a 
prerequisite condition for Assumption 1 to be satisfied. Then, from Proposition 1, 
the first-best outcome is the case where both the franchisor and the franchisee 
make efforts and the franchisee sets the retail prices pi*(1, 1). Meanwhile, for 
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Therefore, the franchisor can set the royalty rate, r, satisfying Eq. (11) by 
employing MBR. Consequently, the franchisor can realize the first-best outcome if 
it sets the wholesale price w1=c1 for goods 1. 
Q.E.D. 
 
3.2 Sales-based Royalty  
In this subsection, we show that the first-best outcome is not attainable under 
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where the superscript S denotes the fact that the franchisor has adopted SBR. Is 
it possible for the first-best efforts to be realized under SBR? If u=d=1 is realized, 
the franchisor should set vi and ci in order to have the efficient retail price pi*(1, 1). 
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Evidently, the franchisor can set the wholesale price as w1=(1-r)c1 for goods 1. As 
the purchasing price for goods 2 is v2=c2, the franchisor should set r=0 in order to 
satisfy Eq. (12). In other words, the franchisor must set r=0 and w1=c1 in order to 
obtain the optimal retail price under SBR.  
















When w1=c1, v2=c2, and r=0 are all satisfied, the expected payoff of the franchisor 
is 
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The above equation implies that the expected payoff for the franchisor decreases 
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with the level of its effort. The result contradicts the first-best outcome that 
requires the franchisor to chooses u=1 at stage two. In fact, the franchisor has no 
incentive to make an effort at stage two under SBR, because the expected payoff 
for the franchisor decreases with the level of its effort in stage two. Therefore, the 
first-best outcome is not attainable under SBR.  
 
4. Concluding Remarks 
In business format franchise contract, the articles that require fulfillment are 
written into the contract. The parties are expressly requested to carry out their 
obligations under the contract. However, it is impossible for a third party to verify 
whether the franchisor and the franchisee have exerted appropriately in their 
efforts or not. A double-sided moral hazard is likely to occur under these 
circumstances. The franchisee may not adequately provide the retail service or 
the local advertising; similarly, the franchisor may not generate national 
advertising, nor take steps to improve product quality, or implement product 
innovation.  
This paper examined the role of a royalty under double-sided moral hazard. 
The main result is that the first-best outcome, under double-sided moral hazard, 
is unattainable by adopting SBR. If the synergistic effect g of their efforts on 
demand is sufficiently large or if the profit increment due to each effort is larger 
than that of each cost, the first-best outcome, under double-sided moral hazard, is 
attainable by adopting MBR. This result explains why MBR is the preferred royal 
system in the franchise contracts of most convenience stores, especially, in Japan.  
The crucial underlying basis of this result is the question of whether the 
franchisor is able to control the retail price of goods 2 or not. The research of the 
comparisons between margin-based tax and sales-based tax is a helpful guide to 
understanding this paper. Note that MBR is to margin-based tax what SBR is to 
sales-based tax. Suppose that both the franchisor and the franchisee make their 
effort appropriately. MBR does not distort the retail price like tax on payoffs. On 
the other hand, SBR distorts the retail price, setting it higher than what MBR 
would have. The distortion effected by a tax on sales can be solved by paying the 
franchisee a subsidy. Alternatively, if a franchisor can completely control the 
wholesale price, it can realize an identical effectiveness by decreasing the 
wholesale price. Furthermore, as shown by Maruyama (2003), when the 
franchisor can control the wholesale price for all goods provided only by it, MBR is 
equivalent to SBR. However, if the franchisor can not completely control the 
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wholesale price, it can not resolve the distortion caused by SBR. Besides, if the 
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